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As interactive technologies become more pervasive, firms are increasingly conducting customer 
surveillance—the acquisition, usage, and storage of consumers’ personal data—more covertly 
and with fewer resources. Privacy calculus—the rational decision to disclose personal data—has 
dominated the literature to explain rational or calculated reactions to customer surveillance, 
however, not all reactions can be explained by rational processes. This article advances our 
understanding of these reactions beyond the privacy calculus concept by proposing attitudes 
toward customer surveillance. Based on levels of consumer privacy and consumer value 
concerns, these attitudes are associated with four archetypes—pragmatists, protectionists, 
capitalists, and apathists. By understanding these attitudes, researchers and managers can gain 
insight into the diversity of consumers’ concerns regarding both consumer privacy and consumer 
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As marketing embraces the science of 
analytics (Bauman and Lyon 2013; Moe and 
Ratchford 2018), marketing managers need 
to reflect on the impact of surveillance 
practices on their customers. Customer 
surveillance, which involves the acquisition, 
usage, or storage of customers’ personal data 
(Plangger and Watson 2015), can be a source 
of competitive advantage by generating 
customer insights. These customer insights 
produce market intelligence—data on 
customers’ needs, preferences, 
characteristics, behavior, attitudes, and other 
attributes—to influence, target, and manage 
customers, as well as to proactively respond 
to customers’ needs (Kohli and Jaworski, 
1990; Wood and Ball 2013; Holtrop et al. 
2017). Managers have a long history of using 
customer surveillance and market 
intelligence to gain a competitive edge and 
enjoy enhanced customer loyalty, 
satisfaction, and relationships (Jaworski and 
Kohli 1993). Marketing intelligence has 
become a central part of marketing operations 
for many firms across a wide variety of 
industries (Moe and Ratchford 2018; 
Albrechtslund 2008; Deighton and Kornfeld 
2009). However, marketing managers also 
need to scrutinize the effects of surveillance 
investments on customers’ attitudes, loyalty, 
and behavior in order to identify and mitigate 
negative outcomes.  
Customers face tradeoffs between 
protecting their personal data and enjoying 
the benefits afforded by firms having access 
to their personal data (e.g., improved 
products, discounts, increased convenience, 
status rewards, etc.). To explain consumer 
reactions to customer surveillance, Culnan 
and Armstrong (1999) propose privacy 
calculus that clarifies how consumers 
rationally balance the benefits and costs of 
disclosing personal data. This rational 
approach has dominated the consumer 
privacy literature (c.f. Dinev et al. 2015; 
Smith et al. 2011); however, rationality can 
often be partial or limited in the context of 
information privacy (John, Acquisti and 
Loewenstein 2011; Poddar, Mosteller and 
Scholder Ellen 2009). This can be driven by 
situational and environmental cues including 
convenience, data requestor-discloser 
relationship, resource limitations, data 
sensitivity, and subjective or cultural norms 
(John et al. 2011; Poddar, Mosteller and 
Scholder Ellen 2009). Furthermore, 
individuals often rely on heuristics to 
accelerate decisions and preserve cognitive 
resources (Kaheman 2011), which are also 
not accounted for in privacy calculus. This 
article proposes attitudes toward customer 
surveillance, which influences both rational 
and heuristic data disclosure decisions. 
From a relationship perspective, firms 
are primarily concerned with serving and 
satisfying current customers, as well as 
attracting potential customers, rather than 
collecting personal data from them (Berry 
and Linoff 2004). Customer relationships, 
which are built on perceptions of integrity 
and honesty (Marshall 1972; Fournier 1988; 
Morgan and Hunt 1994), may wither if 
customer surveillance activities threaten 
customers’ personal data privacy that may 
result in firm-switching behavior. Thus, firms 
must temper the need for customer 
surveillance to protect these relationships 
while still gaining the data they need to 
remain competitive. Firms can achieve this 
balance by thinking strategically about 
customer surveillance instead of focusing on 
different surveillance tactics or technologies 
(Plangger and Watson 2015). Furthermore, 
firms also need to understand how customers 
feel, think, and intend to behave when facing 
surveillance tactics to build an optimal 
customer surveillance strategy.  
Attitudes toward customer 
surveillance are based on individuals’ 
personal concerns (Baumgartner 2002) 
regarding consumer privacy (Malhotra et al. 
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2004; Smith, Milberg, and Burke 1996) and 
consumer value (Lichtenstein, Netemeyer, 
and Burton 1990; Ailawadi, Neslin, and 
Gedenk 2001). These attitudes influence 
consumers’ reactions to customer 
surveillance activities, including changes in 
consumption frequency, switching behavior, 
relative indifference, and changes in other 
attitudes. Based on literature insights, these 
attitudes are theoretically developed in the 
next section by defining their consequences, 
influences, and composition. Then, 
interviews shed light on how these attitudes 
shape behaviors and result in four attitude 
archetypes. Next, a survey study finds 
associations with a number of cultural and 
psychological factors, as well as confirming 
behavioral insights gained from the 
interviews. The article closes by discussing 





Surveillance and privacy 
Surveillance is pervasive in modern society 
as it touches some part of daily life for most 
individuals, whether they are aware of it or 
not (Lyon 2007; Wood and Ball 2013). 
Surveillance is the “focused, systematic, and 
routine attention to personal details for the 
purposes of influence, management, 
protection, or direction” (Lyon 2007, p 14). 
Connected to surveillance is the concept of 
information privacy that involves an 
individual’s ability to control the use, release, 
collection, storage, and access of their 
personal data (Malhotra et al. 2004). The 
more private an individual, firm, or 
organization is, the more others desire 
surveillance of that individual (Lyon 2007). 
Because of this link between information 
privacy and surveillance, surveillance often 
has a negative connotation related to the 
privacy costs and security risks borne by the 
surveillance targets despite the potential 
benefits that may accrue from surveillance 
(Albrechtslund 2008). 
Firms need to acquire data about their 
customers to remain competitive, evaluate 
marketing strategies, innovate market 
offerings, and obtain consumer insights 
(Albrechtslund 2008; Deighton and Kornfeld 
2009; Holtrop et al. 2017). A customer 
surveillance strategy enables customer data 
acquisition though the deployment of 
surveillance tactics. Some common tactics 
involve, for example, tracking transactions 
through loyalty programs (Turow 2008; 
Blattberg and Deighton 1991), observing 
clickstreams or digital behavioral data 
(Bucklin and Sismeiro 2009, 2003), audio or 
video recording consumer interactions 
(Turow 2008; Lyon 2007), and applying 
location-based technologies (e.g., GPS, 
RfID) to monitor consumers or products 
(Junglas and Watson 2008). 
However, customer surveillance also 
risks customer relationships and might even 
breed mistrust among consumers (Mosteller 
and Poddar 2017; Turow 2008). Customer 
relationships with firms are fragile and are 
built on customers’ perceptions of a firm’s 
integrity and honesty (Morgan and Hunt 
1994). If customers discover that their data 
are misused or insecurely stored, customer 
relationships may be damaged, and their 
attitudes toward that firm may be negatively 
impacted (Krafft, Arden and Verhoef 2016; 
Shmargad and Watts 2016; Andrejevic 
2007). Thus, marketing managers and 
researchers need to understand consumers’ 
attitudes toward customer surveillance and 
the influence of those attitudes on behaviors. 
 
Responses to customer surveillance 
As attitudes are cognitive structures that 
shape thoughts, feelings, and intended 
actions (Azjen & Fishbein 1977; Azjen 
2011), attitudes toward customer surveillance 
influence individuals’ behavior when faced 
with personal data disclosure decisions along 
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with other contextual factors. Individuals 
perceive customer surveillance both 
independently and collectively with others 
through media and other interactions 
(McCombs 2004). However, when 
perceptions are shared, individuals often have 
very different reactions to personal data 
threats (Xu et al. 2011). Consider two 
consumers who read the same blog exposing 
a firm’s unknown customer surveillance 
activities resulting in a similar perception of 
the firm’s activities, however they have 
different attitudes toward customer 
surveillance. The consumer with a relatively 
more negative attitude is more likely to 
terminate the relationship with the offending 
firm compared to the other consumer. While 
having similar shared perceptions is useful to 
understand the attitude’s effect, this effect 
likely applies to when perceptions are 
different. 
A negative attitude towards customer 
surveillance does not always translate into 
negative behavior directed to firms that 
conduct the surveillance. While intentions 
commitment can explain part of this 
discrepancy (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977), the 
Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen 2011) 
describes how intentions capture 
motivational influences—attitudes, 
subjective norms, perceived control, past 
behavior—that influence actual behavior. 
However, there are contextual factors that 
also influence actual behavior (e.g., time, 
money, skills, opportunity, perceived control; 
Ajzen 2011). Thus, even when an individual 
intends to avoid customer surveillance due to 
motivational influences, contextual factors 
may upset this intention. While contextual 
factors are important to predict actual 
behavior (Xu et al. 2011; Smith et al. 2011), 
the influence of attitudes toward customer 




Beyond privacy calculus 
Dominating the privacy literature (Dinev et 
al. 2015; Smith et al. 2011), privacy calculus 
describes a rational analysis that balances the 
benefits and costs of disclosing personal data 
to a firm (Culnan and Armstrong 1999). 
When individuals evaluate a disclosure 
decision’s utility (u), they will consider the 
perceived value of the benefits that accrue 
from the exchange (v) minus any monetary 
price (p), search costs (s), and the perceived 
harm of sacrificing privacy (h). Formally:  
 
u = v – (p + s + h) 
 
By increasing search costs (s), individuals 
may find market offerings that either provide 
additional value (v), reduced prices (p), or 
decreased perceived harm (h). Alternatively, 
by sacrificing more of their privacy (h), 
individuals may access personalized offers of 
higher net value (v – p) by tailoring these 
offers using the data disclosed while reducing 
search costs (s). Using privacy calculus, these 
complex tradeoffs are carefully considered 
and thus require considerable cognitive 
resources.  
However, the privacy calculus 
concept does not consider the possibility of 
decisions made using partially rational or 
heuristic decision processes. Especially when 
cognitively overloaded or making 
unimportant decisions, individuals routinely 
preserve cognitive resources and employ 
heuristics developed from past experiences 
and attitudes (Kahneman 2011; Bargh et al. 
2001). Thus, for some consumers, other non-
conscious factors may have greater influence 
than a rational privacy calculus analysis when 
making disclosure decisions (John et al. 
2011).  
The personal concerns of consumer 
privacy and value are two salient factors 
when individuals face disclosure decisions. 
Personal concerns refer to “the goals that 
people pursue in their lives and the effects 
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that these goals have on personal outcomes” 
(Baumgartner 2002: 287). These concerns are 
highly idiographic and contextualized, and 
they influence consumer behavior, attitudes, 
and decisions. As they are derived from 
internal goals, personal concerns can range 
from a very salient concern that directs 
consumption decisions in ways to achieve 
that goal to a very low concern that is likely 
unimportant with regards to decision-making 
(Baumgartner 2002). Specifically, consumer 
privacy concern involves a consumer’s level 
of anxiety about the potential personal 
privacy costs associated with consumption 
(h), while consumer value concern involves a 
consumer’s motivation to seek additional 
benefits (v) and reduce costs that accrue from 
consumption (p + s). The relative salience 
between these personal concerns forms 
attitudes toward customer surveillance that 
can influence decisions to disclose data.  
Consumer Privacy Concern 
Consumer privacy concern refers to the 
anxiety individuals experience regarding 
their personal data in the consumption 
context (Smith et al. 2011). Although privacy 
in cultural (Mehta and Belk 1991) and socio-
demographic (Hill and Stamey 1990) 
contexts may differ, this article defines 
privacy as an outcome of an individual’s 
desire to withhold personal data from others 
(Larson and Bell 1988). Individuals perceive 
personal data as private when those data are 
central to their identity (e.g., birth date, 
sexual orientation, relationship status, 
address, credit card, and health data), or when 
there is a non-intimate relationship between 
the data discloser and the recipient (Marshall 
1972). Consumers often have intimate 
relationships with firms (Fournier 1988); 
thus, they may feel that some data requested 
by these firms are not private. Privacy 
perceptions can be impacted by 
environmental cues that either induce or 
mitigate individuals’ privacy concerns (John 
et al. 2011). However, even though privacy 
perceptions can be manipulated, salient 
consumer privacy concerns can impact 
behavior by forming decision heuristics 
(Phelps, Nowak, and Ferrell 2000). 
Consumers differ with regard to 
privacy concern reflecting their anxieties that 
firms will not be faithful to the implicit 
contract when exchanging their data for 
benefits (Phelps et al. 2000). Those who are 
extremely concerned with privacy form 
decision heuristics to protect their privacy 
and will likely reject firms’ data requests 
quickly. Alternatively, those who are less 
concerned with privacy will likely not have a 
privacy protecting heuristic and could spend 
more time considering data requests. 
Consumers who have some concern for their 
privacy will likely rationally weigh consumer 
privacy concerns with other contextual 
factors to make a disclosure decision similar 
to the privacy calculus concept. Thus, the 
salience level of individuals’ consumer 
privacy concern partly influences their 
attitude towards customer surveillance. 
Consumer Value Concern  
Consumer value concern refers to the anxiety 
consumers experience obtaining increased 
benefits and reduced costs from their 
consumption (Lichtenstein, Netemeyer, and 
Burton 1990; Ailawadi, Neslin, and Gedenk 
2001). Consumer value involves an 
assessment of a product or service’s ability to 
achieve value goals weighed against 
perceived sacrifices (Zeithaml, 1988; 
Woodruff 1997; Kim and Niehm 2009) 
through the provision of utilitarian (e.g., 
discounts on price, added convenience, more 
freebies) and hedonic (e.g., higher status 
level, access to exclusive information, added 
fun or adventure) benefits (Sherry 1990; 
Babin, Darden and Griffin 1994; Shankar et 
al. 2016). This perceived value has functional 
(i.e., how well a product performs), social 
(i.e., how it signals status), emotional (i.e., 
how it generates affect), epistemic (i.e., how 
it satisfies the need for knowledge), and 
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conditional (i.e., how it is relevant to the 
situation) categories of expected utility 
(Sheth, Newman, and Gross 1991). Network 
effects (e.g., word-of-mouth, observational 
learning; Marchand and Hennig-Thurau 
2013) also affect consumer value. Value 
perceptions have been successfully 
controlled in past experiments by 
manipulating reference prices (Alford and 
Biswas 2002), goal concreteness (Lee and 
Ariely 2006), and positive affect (Yoon and 
Vargas 2010). These studies find that a 
salient consumer value concern can affect 
consumers’ choices through the activation of 
heuristic mechanisms.   
Individuals differ with regard to their 
value concerns and show varying levels of 
anxiety for obtaining additional value within 
a consumption context (Babin et al. 1994; 
Ailawadi et al. 2001; Shankar et al. 2016). 
Those individuals with highly salient value 
concern would likely form a strong decision 
heuristic to seek out additional benefits 
offered from personal data disclosure, 
whereas those that are less concerned would 
not likely form this heuristic. Outside of these 
extremes, consumers who have some degree 
of concern for consumer value would likely 
engage in a rational process to decide 
whether to disclose their personal data. 
The marketing literature understands 
many aspects of consumer value concern 
from the perspective of sales transactions; 
however, outside this specific (albeit large 
and important) context, there has been little 
research. From the perspective of personal 
data disclosure, privacy researchers have 
largely discounted the benefits of customer 
surveillance as being relatively small 
compared to the personal privacy and data 
security costs (c.f., Turow 2008; Andrejevic 
2007; Smith et al. 2011). Consumer value 
concern partly influences consumers’ 
decision to disclose data, thus forming an 
integral part of their attitudes toward 
customer surveillance.  
Attitudes Toward Customer Surveillance 
Taken together, the personal concerns for 
consumer privacy and value form attitudes 
toward customer surveillance that reflect how 
individuals think, feel, and intend to act in 
response to customer surveillance situations. 
The Stimulus-Organism-Response 
framework (Wang et al. 2019; Poddar et al. 
2009; Davis & Luthans 1980) illustrates the 
impact that these attitudes have on disclosure 
decisions. Individuals faced with disclosure 
decisions (i.e., stimulus) mentally process 
them (i.e., organism) in a way that influences 
how those individuals decide to act (i.e., 
response). Considering only the organism 
and its mental processes, attitudes towards 
customer surveillance provide a lens for 
individuals to interpret disclosure decisions 
before them. Consistent with the privacy 
calculus formula introduced above, these 
attitudes influence perceptions of net value (v 
– p) and privacy cost (h) of disclosing data 
regardless of specific contexts. However, 
there are remaining research questions about 
how these attitudes work in practice to 
influence decisions that the next section will 
explore using interviews and a survey:  
1) How do consumer privacy and value 
concerns influence disclosure behavior? 
2) What other factors influence perceptions 
of customer surveillance? 
3) What strategies are employed by 
individuals to manage customer surveillance? 
4) How do individuals make decisions to 





The interview study further develops the 
understanding of attitudes towards customer 
surveillance by exploring the four research 
questions posed above. It reports the results 
of 26 semi-structured interviews that 
investigate individuals’ attitudes towards 
customer surveillance and their influence on 
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disclosure decisions. Interviews are a 
common method that allows informants to 
offer deep explanations of concepts that are 
poorly understood (Arnold and Fischer 1994; 
Creswell 2009), such as these attitudes. An 
interview worksheet guided the interviews to 
direct informants to four customer 
surveillance topics without referring to 
‘surveillance.’ Interviews began with privacy 
and personal data definitions to qualify 
informants’ responses. Next, they explored 
informants’ views on, and experiences with, 
customer surveillance (e.g., loyalty cards in 
their wallets). Informants reported a variety 
of positive and negative experiences with 
data requests, which were used to examine 
their feelings, thoughts, and behaviors. They 
were then asked to offer advice for both a 
friend and a firm on how to manage data 
requests. Finally, interviews closed by 
recording demographics to aid informant 
comparison. 
The interviews were recorded, 
transcribed, and then analyzed using an 
inductive approach with the following steps: 
(1) open coding of the first set of ten 
interviews; (2) developing general themes 
and patterns that emerge from the analysis to 
create core categories; (3) axial coding (i.e., 
the disaggregation of core categories) to 
refine the definition of and understand the 
relationship between core categories; and (4) 
hermeneutic interpretation of the findings 
(Arnould and Fischer 1994). Privacy and 
value concerns were coded to aid the 
mapping of informants into archetypes. Some 
informants exhibited high degrees of privacy 
concern in a general or government 
surveillance context, but this did not always 
translate into consumer privacy concern. 
While there is a possibility of a single 
researcher coding bias, the authors attempted 
to minimize the possible impact of such bias 
on the analysis through discussions with 
several privacy scholars about coding 
assessments and theme conclusions.  
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Table 1: Informant Details 
 
Informant Gender Age Industry Nationality 
A Female Early 30s Student Canadian 
B Male Early 30s Student Canadian 
C Male Late 40s Finance British 
D Male Early 40s Administration British 
E Female Early 30s Finance Canadian 
F Female Late 20s Construction Canadian 
G Female Early 50s Sales Canadian 
H Male Late 20s Law Australian 
I Male Mid 30s Education Taiwanese 
J Female Early 30s Healthcare Canadian 
K Female Late 20s Education South African 
L Female Mid 30s Creative Canadian 
M Female Mid 30s Education American 
N Female Early 30s Healthcare Canadian 
O Male Early 30s Education Canadian 
P Male Mid 20s Finance Chinese 
Q Female Early 20s Student American 
R Male Late 20s Healthcare Canadian 
S Male Mid 30s Creative Canadian 
T Female Late 30s Administration Canadian 
U Male Early 40s Student Canadian 
V Male Late 20s Student Chinese 
W Female Mid 30s Education Saudi Arabian 
X Female Early 30s Student German 
Y Female Early 30s Consulting Korean 
Z Male Early 30s Education Turkish 
 
Informants were invited to participate 
in interviews across various demographic 
categories (e.g., gender, age, culture, and 
occupation) to provide a broad range of 
perspectives on customer surveillance. They 
were asked to suggest other potential 
informants using a snowball sampling 
method until theoretical saturation and no 
new insights emerged from the informants’ 
responses (Creswell 2009). All informant 
interviews took place either via Skype or 
face-to-face in Canada or the United 
Kingdom. Theoretical saturation became 
evident after 22 interviewers (i.e., at least two 
individuals were mapped into archetypes); 
however, four additional interviews were also 
performed, as they were already scheduled. 
Interviews lasted an average of 24 minutes. 
Table 1 reports informants’ gender, 
occupation industry, age, and nationality.  
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The interview findings have been 
organized into four attitude archetypes 
depending on the exhibited salience of the 
personal concerns for consumer privacy and 
value: protectionists, capitalists, pragmatists, 
and apathists (see Figure 1). Protectionists 
are highly concerned with consumer privacy 
but are not concerned with consumer value. 
Thus, they are likely to quickly refuse 
personal data requests even when offered 
valuable benefits due to the risk to their 
personal data. Capitalists are very concerned 
with seeking out consumer value without 
much concern for their consumer privacy, so 
they are more likely to quickly disclose 
personal data if there is a clear benefit to 
them. Pragmatists have high personal 
concerns for both consumer privacy and 
consumer value, so they are more likely to 
rationally consider personal data requests. 
Finally, apathists report not having personal 
concern for either consumer privacy or value, 
so their disclosure decisions are likely to be 
influenced by other factors. The next four 
sub-sections examine evidence from the 
informants’ responses to deepen the 
understanding of the archetypes.  
Protectionists 
Protectionist informants exhibit a high 
consumer privacy concern and a relatively 
low value concern that negatively impact 
disclosure behaviors including, in some 
extreme cases, the rejection of digital 
interactions (Milne and Culnan 2004). 
Turning first to consumer privacy concern, 
Informant N highlights collection and 
awareness concerns in her comment, “I 
wouldn’t like it if [firms] had all my info and 
they knew everything about me before I step 
through the door.” Similarly, Informant G 
displays considerable concern over private 
data collection when she states, “it’s nobody 
else’s business unless I decide it is somebody 
else’s business”.  
Informant R is also careful about 
whom he provides with his personal data; 
when advising a hypothetical friend, he said:  
You don’t just share your information 
because someone asked you to. Try to 
find out why that group or that 
company wants to know that 
information. So, in general, just be 
careful. 
Informant R goes on to confirm that he is 
skeptical of firms’ intentions regarding his 
personal data. In this case, as in the case of 
many other protectionists, his concern for 
privacy stretches to his professional and 
social life, not just his consumer activities. 
Many protectionist informants claim 
that there are few customer surveillance 
benefits that they perceive as worthwhile. For 
example, Informant G was adamant in her 
comment about the benefits of disclosure:  
For me? Zero, zero benefits for me. 
For them, there is, to acquire [my 
personal data] because they can use it 
for marketing. But for me, it is a 
liability for me. People can break in 
and use your personal information, or 
unsavory things too. 
While this informant feels very strongly 
about the lack of value for her, some other 






















responses. Informant Q admits to considering 
some benefits but still relies on a “do not 
disclose” heuristic. She claims, “[firms] only 
need an email and birthdate to send the 
freebies. [They] don’t need anything else.” 
Thus, she admits to accepting “freebies” but 
is wary of how free a “freebie” is in terms of 
privacy cost. In sum, protectionists are 
characterized by their lack of consumer value 
concern and highly salient concern for 
consumer privacy. These privacy concerns 
significantly undermine protectionists’ 
motivation to seek additional value through 
the data disclosure, thus may lead to 
heuristic-based decisions.  
Capitalists 
Informants that fall into the capitalist 
quadrant exhibit a keen understanding that 
their personal data are a commodity that they 
can trade for a range of benefits to obtain 
additional value. For example, Informant E 
explains how she sees her personal data: 
I drive a [SUV] that costs $75 to fill 
up, so I might as well get some reward 
in addition to the utility I already get 
from purchasing food or whatever or 
gas. And if I can get more and it’s not 
totally free, because I am trading in 
my information, [it still] feels free. 
So, it seems like a win-win. I used my 
points to buy gas and other stuff… So, 
I get free stuff, and I like free stuff. 
She explains she does not mind providing her 
personal data to firms, especially when the 
data collection happens during her regular 
shopping routine.  
Capitalists are motivated by the 
opportunity to increase consumer value and 
this motivation offsets their privacy concerns. 
They are primarily driven to maximize 
functional value (e.g., reduce price, get a 
better deal, access to sales promotions), 
although the emotional (e.g., feel good) and 
conditional value (e.g., special occasion) 
dimensions also play a role in their decision 
to disclose. Informant W reflects this when 
she talks about point cards: “I really need that 
card because the points there are very 
helpful.” Later she elaborates on the 
consumer value she receives from a loyalty 
card: “I will get more opportunities, like 
when the new [fashion] collection comes, 
[the firm] will have champagne parties or 
something, and they have sales”; “I love it 
[that] for my birthday, they sent me a Happy 
Birthday card and discounted everything for 
three days.” Thus, for informant W, the 
functional, emotional and conditional 
consumer value she gets outweighs any 
consumer privacy concern she may have. 
Regarding her reasons for disclosing personal 
data, Informant K says, “No, absolutely and I 
don’t mind them having my personal 
information, because I get a lot of benefits 
from it.” Informant E adds a reason for this 
lack of concern for consumer privacy:  
I think actually for the most part firms 
are collecting information so they can 
grow their business, so they can target 
demographics and kind of maximize 
their earning potential because they 
are able to find out exactly what you 
need, when you need it, and how 
much you want to spend, and then 
deliver that to you, and they can do 
better themselves. 
She theorizes that firms are collecting this 
data for their mutual benefit to improve the 
goods she buys in functional ways. 
Many capitalist informants exhibit 
high degrees of trust in firms, as Informant E 
states: “I don’t think that anyone really wants 
personal information so that they can bring 
you harm”. Informant C reveals that he trusts 
firms more than government when he said, 
“Actually, I am far more scared of the police 
and other [government] services and things 
like that, than I am of people who, like me, 
are businessmen just trying to sell 
something.” Informant B echoes this by 
saying, “I would probably say if you are 
going to over share, stick with trusted 
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companies that you know. It’s probably 
going to be okay.” Informant B explains that 
there are implicit firm-consumer contracts 
when he elaborates: 
I assume based on the kind of implicit 
honor system here that if I give you 
information for a purpose, that is what 
you are going to use it for and… 
nothing else, unless you ask me. 
Those to me are kind of implicit rules 
of engagement, and as long as 
everybody sticks to that, we are cool. 
Outside of the contract metaphor, other 
capitalist informants show their high levels of 
trust in firms. Informant C provides insight 
into how capitalists interpret customer 
surveillance by stating:  
That is [marketing’s] job. Their 
motive is to sell things of a certain 
value, and they are using technology 
that is available to them. I am a 
technologist, as you know, but every 
technology has got its good and evil.  
Thus, capitalists not only are characterized by 
trusting firms with their personal data but 
also lack the emotive responses of the 
protectionists in response to consumer 
privacy threats. 
Many capitalist informants are aware 
of customer surveillance in their lives, but 
their trust in firms may weaken their concern 
for consumer privacy. Informant T reports 
low privacy concerns, as she believes that 
personal data requests are not about privacy 
concerns: 
Is it a privacy thing? I don’t know if it 
is so much of a privacy concern. It is 
more of my concern in terms of ‘I 
don’t want your email and I don’t 
want to be part of your club’, but I 
don’t know that I am concerned about 
them knowing that I shop at [their 
store].  
For her, as well as other capitalists, disclosure 
requests are turned down not for consumer 
privacy reasons but for the lack of explicit 
utility or irritation at the lack of convenience. 
Many capitalists claim that they wish 
that customer surveillance activities were 
even more pervasive, as they think it would 
make the consumption experience easier. 
Informant K states, “I like [Internet] cookies 
because I love to get targeted, and so I don’t 
mind for Google or whatever to know what I 
am searching, because it is going to make my 
online experience better.” Informant O agrees 
with this opinion, as he says in frustration:  
If [firms] are smart, I am like, ‘why 
are you wasting my time, you could 
be getting this data from other data 
sources… you know where I live, so 
why are you asking for this [stuff]?’ 
It’s annoying if you go to a hotel and 
they don’t recognize that you’ve 
stayed there before, let alone 
recognize that you’ve been to the 
chain before. 
These informants report that they prefer to 
disclose personal data to increase 
convenience in their lives or obtain some 
other explicit hedonic or utilitarian benefits. 
As capitalists are characterized by a very 
salient concern for value without much 
concern for consumer privacy, they form a 
bias that directs their decision making when 
faced with disclosure requests. In extreme 
cases, this can result in a pro-value heuristic 
that leads to faster decisions to entertain 
disclosure requests to gain additional value. 
Pragmatists 
Pragmatists are characterized by high 
concerns for both consumer privacy and 
consumer value. These informants carefully 
evaluate each instance of customer 
surveillance they encounter to assess 
consumer privacy risks and potential 
consumer value. Informant D advises:  
Depending on whether or not you like 
to buy things at those companies, you 
have the right to choose whether or 
not you want to give [them] your 
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information and whether or not what 
they give you back in exchange for 
your information is something you 
value. So, you are selling your 
information. It is a give and take. 
For him, personal data are commodities that 
need protection and are shared only for 
valuable benefits. This is typical for 
pragmatists, as they carefully weigh the 
benefits and the risks of disclosing personal 
data.  
However, consumer value is not the 
only aspect that pragmatists consider when 
deciding to provide data, as Informant X 
explains:  
I would never ever, ever give my 
details to… any kind of company that 
in my consideration is unethical… 
Because it’s just, in my head, I don’t 
like them as a company, because it’s 
unethical to me what they are doing, 
and therefore I kind of make this 
association that I don’t trust them in 
terms of my details.  
Thus, she values her personal data and filters 
firms based on their reputation. Like 
protectionists, pragmatists consider a firm’s 
characteristics and their social relationship to 
that firm when deciding to disclose their data.  
Pragmatists are characterized by a 
high consumer value concern that competes 
with their privacy concern, as Informant H 
reports:  
[Firms having access to my data is] 
useful to me in a sense. I feel I like 
this brand… [is] actually using [my] 
information in a meaningful way… 
[But] just because I shop once on a 
website or [go] into some random 
shop to buy something, I don’t want 
to be on their database and be there 
for 5, 10, 15 years… I just don’t want 
all this information out there about 
myself. So, I am careful about who I 
give my information to. 
This informant recognizes that there are 
valuable benefits, especially with firms he 
uses frequently, but he is also worried about 
his personal data being kept by firms that he 
does frequent. As such, he is a typical 
pragmatist, since they require clear evidence 
of potential value in exchange for their data, 
like capitalists. Although their assessment of 
value is often based on the functional 
dimension, emotional and social dimensions 
also play a role in influencing pragmatists’ 
overall perception of consumer value. The 
complex relationship between the competing 
high personal concerns for consumer privacy 
and consumer value forces pragmatists to 
rationally consider cases of customer 
surveillance. 
Apathists 
Apathists, or apathetic consumers, are 
characterized by a low concern for both 
consumer privacy and consumer value. 
Although there were just two informants that 
exhibited this archetype, they are essential to 
include, as they provide an important contrast 
to the other three archetypes. Because of their 
lack of consumer privacy concern, apathists 
apparently do not mind sharing their personal 
data. For example, Informant S repeatedly 
responded “No” or “No, I think I am fine with 
that” to questions asking whether he had a 
problem with retail firms, such as his local 
grocery store or Amazon, tracking his 
purchasing and shopping behavior. He 
elaborates:  
[Tracking] what I buy doesn’t bother 
me, because it could help [the firm]. 
They want… to know if people are 
going to buy this much stuff, etc., and 
that could help them to know how 
much they should buy or produce [of 
that] stuff. Maybe it’s because I may 
not buy stuff that I am afraid that 
other people would know, you know. 
I buy other stuff… so I don’t care.  
Informant S is like many capitalist informants 
in his view of consumer privacy both in his 
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view on the purpose of customer surveillance 
and in his claim that he has nothing to hide. 
Informant V further describes her beliefs: “In 
fact, I think it’s not about caring or not about 
[consumer privacy]; because we live in the 
21st century, we always need to provide some 
data, and I don’t think it is very serious.” 
Informant V reports that while she feels a 
lack of control over personal data, she thinks 
that disclosing personal data is a requirement 
of being part of modern society. These 
informants go on to describe the 
inconvenience or boredom of receiving data 
collection requests from firms, as well as a 
general lack of anxiety regarding customer 
surveillance. Thus, apathists have a relatively 
low concern for consumer privacy. 
Turning now to the concern for 
consumer value, neither of the apathetic 
informants could quickly recall being part of 
any point or loyalty programs; however, after 
probing further, it was found that both were 
part a program: Informant S receives a free 
movie as a reward from the local cinema, 
while Informant V gets a free coffee after 
buying nine coffees at a coffee shop she 
frequents. However, both explained that they 
did not seek out these programs, as capitalists 
would have. Moreover, they did not avoid 
joining other loyalty programs because of 
some privacy fear, like protectionists. Thus, 
these apathetic informants are characterized 
as not seeking consumer value nor wanting to 
protect their privacy, which leads them not to 
rationally consider disclosure requests.  
The following study show evidence 
that confirms the speed at which disclosure 
decisions are made do differ across the 
archetypes, as well as providing additional 
clarity on how behavioral, cultural, and 
psychological factors vary between 
archetypes.  
Survey study 
The results of an online survey reveal not 
only additional depth into the four attitude 
archetypes in terms of behavioral, cultural 
and psychographic differences, but also 
insights into cognitive processing variations. 
Conducted using the services of 
TurkPrime.com, the survey received 752 
complete responses from English-speaking 
consumers (Americans = 89.1%, British = 
4.9%, Canadians 3.8%, others 2.2%). 
However, after removing failed attention 
checks and non-unique IP addresses, 688 
remained in the sample. The sample is 
slightly biased towards females (53.3%), 
relatively young with 68.2% under 35 years 
old and largely employed (67.4%) with 
85.9% having some kind of post-secondary 
education. The vast majority of the sample 
identifies as white (72.4%) with 52.5% 
reporting that they make under US$40,000. 
These sociodemographic characteristics were 
not significant indicators of disclosure 
behavior or associated with the archetypes.  
These archetypes are extreme 
theoretical individuals, thus they were 
produced from three-way splits of 
respondents’ answers to Dinev and Hart’s 
(2006) Internet privacy concern scale (mean 
= 5.04, median = 5.25, standard deviation = 
1.53, alpha = 0.92) and Lichtenstein et al.’s 
(1990) value consciousness scale (mean = 
5.84, median = 5.86, standard deviation = 
0.78, alpha = 0.80). The middle third of 
respondents for each scale was removed from 
the analysis to highlight individuals that 
reported having more extreme concerns for 
either privacy or value. The resulting 
archetype distribution had 140 apathists, 55 
protectionists, 69 capitalists, and 108 
pragmatists. The following paragraphs detail 
the behavioral, cultural, and psychological 
findings in regard to these archetypes (see 
Table 2). 
Behavioral findings 
Disclosure behavior was elicited by a 
scenario where respondents were randomly 
exposed to one of three privacy policies for a 
smartphone app that were identical except for 
the app domain context (i.e., travel, finance, 
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and health) to test the impact of sensitivity of 
data disclosure. They were asked a single 
item (i.e., “Do you accept this privacy policy 
so you can use the app?” measured on a five-
point scale from “definitely no” to “definitely 
yes”). While the different app contexts did 
not show significant differences for 
disclosure decisions (F(2,335) = 0.096, p = 
0.908), there were significant differences in 
the disclosure behavior between the 
archetypes (F(3,335) = 17.49, p < 0.001). 
Across all three app contexts, capitalists and 
apathists were significantly more likely to 
disclose information by accepting the terms 
and conditions stated in the privacy policy 
than pragmatists and protectionists.  
 
 
Table 2: Survey study results 
 
Variable Descriptives   Attitude Archetypes   One-way ANOVA 






ists   F(3,335) p value 
Decision time 
(seconds) 77.69 72.60   62.93a 72.17 72.89b 97.77a,b   4.53 0.004 
Decision to 
disclose 3.63 1.36   4.14c,d 3.09c,e 4.06e,f 3.12 d,f   17.49  < 0.001 
Decision 
comfort 6.06 1.08   5.88h 5.87g 6.41g,h 6.09   3.95 0.009 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 4.22 0.62   3.96i,j,m 4.13j,l 4.26k,m 4.48i,k,l   14.60  < 0.001 
Collectivism 3.07 0.82   3.11 2.85 3.12 3.10   1.54 0.204 
Long-term 
orientation 4.01 0.65   3.57n,o,p 3.95n 4.15o 4.38n,p   37.97  < 0.001 
Extraversion 3.51 1.55   3.31 3.51 3.52 3.69   1.07 0.362 
Agreeableness 4.93 1.18   4.76q 4.72r 4.92 5.20q,r   3.19 0.024 
Conscient-
iousness 5.24 1.29   4.78s,t 5.53s 5.13u 5.62t,u   9.07  < 0.001 
Emotional 
stability 4.49 1.45   4.44 4.42 4.54 4.55   0.18 0.912 
Open to new 
experiences 5.18 1.19   4.69v,x,y 5.22v 5.42x 5.47y   9.60  < 0.001 
n 336     104 55 69 108       
Note: Superscripts indicate significant contrasting differences, p < 0.05 
 
The time that respondents used to read 
the app's privacy policy statement and make 
the decision to accept the policy and use the 
app was also recorded. While the different 
app contexts did not show significant 
differences for decision time (F(2,335) = 
0.084, p = 0.919), there were significant 
differences between the archetypes in the 
time it took respondents to read the policy 
and make a decision (F(3,335) = 4.53, p = 
0.004). Pragmatists took the longest time to 
read and decide to accept the policy 
compared to the other three archetypes, 
which were not significantly different from 
each other (F(2, 227) = 0.75, p = 0.472). This 
shows evidence that pragmatists, who have 
high privacy and high value concerns, spend 
significantly more time reading and 
considering their decision to accept the 
privacy policy than other respondents that 
have a dominant concern (i.e., capitalists and 
protectionists) or are relatively unconcerned 
with value and privacy (i.e., apathists). Thus, 
regardless of data sensitivity context, these 
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findings confirm that individuals have 
different decision processes depending on the 
salience of their personal concerns for value 
and privacy.  
Furthermore, respondents were asked 
to report their comfort with their decision 
using a single-item (i.e., “How comfortable 
are you with your decision?” measured on a 
seven-point scale from “extremely 
uncomfortable” to “extremely comfortable”), 
which varied significantly across archetypes 
(F(3,335) = 3.95, p = 0.009). Capitalists were 
the most comfortable with their decisions to 
accept the privacy policy and use the app 
compared to pragmatists (t(175) = 1.99, p = 
0.048), apathists (t(171) = 3.37, p = 0.001), 
and protectionists (t(122) = 2.746, p = 0.007). 
Pragmatists, protectionists, and apathists 
were similarly comfortable with their 
decision (F(2,264) = 1.45, p = 0.306). Thus, 
these results show that attitudes toward 
customer surveillance do impact disclosure 




Cultural contexts have been shown to have 
powerful impacts on behaviors, thus it is 
included here as potential influencing factors. 
Cultural dimensions were measured at the 
individual level using Yoo, Donthu and 
Lenartowicz’s (2011) scales for uncertainty 
avoidance (mean = 4.22, standard deviation = 
0.62, alpha = 0.84), collectivism (mean = 
3.07, standard deviation = 0.82, alpha = 
0.82), and long-term orientation (mean = 
4.01, standard deviation = 0.65, alpha = 
0.75). Respondents reported significantly 
different levels of uncertainty avoidance 
among the four archetypes (F (3,335) = 
14.60, p < 0.001) with pragmatists not 
tolerating uncertainty relatively well 
compared to apathists, while protectionists 
and capitalists were not significantly 
different from one another. Collectivism was 
similar among the archetypes (F(3,335) = 
1.54, p = 0.204). Individuals’ long-term 
orientation was significantly different 
between archetypes (F(3,335) = 37.97, p < 
0.001) with pragmatists and capitalists caring 
more about the future compared to apathists 
or protectionists. Thus, these findings 
indicate that cultural dimensions are indeed 
associated with different attitudes toward 
customer surveillance.  
 
Psychological findings 
Individuals’ attitudes and behavior are 
shaped by their personality. Respondents’ big 
five personality traits were measured using 
Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann’s (2003) 
scale: extraversion (mean = 3.51, standard 
deviation = 1.55), agreeableness (mean = 
4.93, standard deviation = 1.18), 
conscientiousness (mean = 5.24, standard 
deviation =1.29), emotional stability (mean = 
4.49, standard deviation = 1.45), and 
openness to new experiences (mean = 5.18, 
standard deviation = 1.19). There were no 
significant differences with regard to 
respondents’ reported levels of extraversion 
(F(3,335) = 1.07, p = 0.362) or emotional 
stability (F(3,335) = 0.18, p = 0.912). The 
personality dimensions of agreeableness 
(F(3,335) = 3.19, p = 0.024), 
conscientiousness (F(3,335) = 9.07, p < 
0.001), openness to new experiences 
(F(3,335) = 9.60, p < 0.001) were all 
significantly different across the attitude 
archetypes following similar patterns going 
from relatively low scores for apathists and 
protectionists to higher scores for capitalists 
and pragmatists. Thus, these results show that 
some of the big five personality dimensions 
(i.e., agreeableness, conscientiousness, and 
openness to new experiences) are associated 




The results of two empirical studies first 
develop archetypes of attitudes toward 
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customer surveillance, and then offer 
confirmatory evidence on the behavioral 
consequences and additional insight into 
potential antecedents of these attitudes. In the 
interview study, informants reported 
different reactions towards customer 
surveillance, and these reactions can be 
mapped onto the four attitude archetypes as 
illustrated above in Figure 1. Table 3 reports 
a summary of these results across archetypes 
broken down into the three components of an 
attitude and serves as a useful comparison 
tool. 
 









 Thoughts Feelings Intended 
Behaviors 











Low High Implicit contract 
with firms; trust 
firms 
Enjoy utility and 
feelings of status 
Predisposed to 
disclose data if 
benefit is explicit 
Pragmatists 
 
High High Carefully 
consider the 
merits of each 
request 









Low Low Do not consider 




annoyed; feel a 
lack of control  
Do not seek 
value but often 
provide data 
 
Despite variations in attitudes toward 
customer surveillance, many informants 
reported using a variety of obfuscation 
strategies. However, for the most part, these 
strategies were employed for very different 
reasons. Protectionist informants, for 
example, gave false or confusing data to 
firms to protect their personal privacy. 
Capitalist informants, in contrast, gave 
misleading data to prevent potential irritation 
from firms that did not provide explicit value 
in return for their personal data. This result 
confirms a similar empirical finding from a 
survey of Internet users (Milne and Culnan 
2004), which found that participants either 
were concerned for their data privacy or 
simply wanted to avoid the irritation of junk 
email communication. 
While protectionists and pragmatists 
expressed their consumer privacy concerns in 
both empirical studies, capitalists and 
apathists did not show much concern over 
consumer privacy. This finding supports 
many empirical studies (Milne and Bahl 
2010; Dinev and Hart 2006; Malhotra et al. 
2004; Phelps et al. 2000) that claim that 
individuals have different responses to 
privacy and privacy threats.  
As in privacy calculus research (Xu et 
al. 2011; Smith et al. 2011; Dinev and Hart 
2006), pragmatists in interviews reported 
having competing high consumer privacy 
concern and high consumer value concerns, 
suggesting a rational decision process that 
results in longer decision times, which is 
confirmed in the survey study. For the other 
three archetypes, consumer privacy and 
consumer value concerns were found to be 
different or at low levels. Thus, decisions to 
disclose are less likely to be fully considered 
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or calculated and might indicate the presence 
of decision heuristics, which may have been 
developed due to the dominant concern. 
Protectionists would not be satisfied with 
additional value in return for providing 
personal data, as their consumer privacy 
concerns likely cannot be diminished or 
subdued by increased offered value. 
Similarly, capitalists operate in the opposite 
fashion, where providing more consumer 
privacy assurance does not motivate 
increased disclosure of personal data, as they 
respond to value opportunities. Considering 
the S-O-R framework (Wang et al. 2019; 
Poddar et al. 2009; Davis & Luthans 1980) 
again, individuals are responding to 
disclosure requests in ways to maximize their 
personal goals while minimizing cognitive 
effort. Thus, protectionists and capitalists are 
less likely to make calculated decisions and 
may rely instead on consumer privacy and 
value heuristics, respectively. Regardless of 
either consumer value offered or consumer 
privacy threats, apathists report a lack of 
concern for both value and privacy, and thus 
are likely to be influenced by external factors. 
Alternatively, these responses could be 
explained using the theory of learned 
helplessness (Maier & Seligman 1976, 2016), 
as apathists may believe they cannot 
effectively manage their data privacy. Using 
these four attitude archetypes, marketing 
researchers and managers can understand 
how individuals are predisposed to customer 
surveillance and develop strategies to both 
protect relationships while gaining valuable 
consumer data. 
Managerial implications 
Attitudes toward customer surveillance are 
important for firms to consider when making 
decisions regarding customer surveillance 
activities, privacy policies, segment 
targeting, or customer surveillance disaster 
response. In the interview study, most 
informants advised firms to be more 
transparent and explicit about consumer 
privacy risks and potential consumer value 
derived from disclosing personal data. 
As protectionist consumers are 
chiefly concerned with limiting their 
consumer privacy risks, offering more 
information about how their personal data 
would be collected, stored, and used, as well 
as offering assurances of data security, might 
allay some of these concerns. However, this 
additional information also highlights the 
firm’s customer surveillance activities and 
perhaps a more strategic approach is needed. 
Firms might target protectionist consumers 
by offering specific, customized services to 
ensure that their personal data concerns are 
respected. For example, protectionists might 
pay a premium for a credit card that collects 
no additional data and deletes or refreshes 
transaction history frequently. By designing 
these privacy-aware products and services, 
firms can strategically create much value in 
the minds of protectionist consumers that are 
predisposed to reduce privacy risks.  
Capitalist consumers care primarily 
about deriving the most consumer value out 
of their data resources. Firms can 
strategically target capitalists by highlighting 
the explicit benefits available to those 
disclosing data, including for example added 
convenience, enhanced services, exclusive 
information, or additional discounts. Using a 
credit card example again, capitalists might 
prefer an offer that includes location-specific 
personalized services and discounts for 
disclosing real-time location data to the credit 
card company. Firms can reimagine products 
and services by explicitly using capitalist 
consumers’ data to enhance the utilitarian and 
hedonic benefits available to these consumers 
that are predisposed to seek out value. 
While apathists may not worry about 
either consumer privacy or consumer value, 
these consumers do likely worry about other 
firm attributes. These attributes can be 
discovered through market research and may 
include for example enhanced corporate 
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social responsibility programs, leading 
corporate ethics policies, brand status, or 
brand reputation. 
Managers can develop strategic 
customer surveillance activities that are 
sensitive to these archetypes by personalizing 
the level of personal information disclosure 
requested, thus protecting customer 
relationships while providing valuable 
customer data. In doing so, managers may 
successfully attract new “blue sky” segments 
that are not having their specific needs 
serviced by any provider through strategies 
that offer enhanced privacy protection 
services, more explicit value opportunities, or 
clearer information about the privacy risks 
and benefits. 
Towards a Research Agenda  
Customer surveillance is an important part of 
marketing that ensures that firms have the 
data they need to innovate their products and 
services to remain competitive. While this 
article introduces and explores attitudes 
toward customer surveillance, there are 
several avenues that researchers could 
investigate in the future. A research agenda is 
outlined below to develop a robust 
understanding of how these attitudes impact 
consumers and their decisions. 
The disclosure context and its 
associated variables likely also contribute to 
consumer reactions to customer surveillance. 
Although the data sensitivity context was not 
significant in the survey study, contextual 
variables are likely to be factors contributing 
to consumer responses to data disclosure 
requests, such as for example firm 
relationship strength, customer satisfaction, 
firm positioning, firm attributed status, firm 
reputation, or severity of privacy threat. 
Future research should consider how 
variations in the attitude toward customer 
surveillance may or may not influence the 
perception or salience of the context 
surrounding a data disclosure request. 
The tenuous connection between 
attitudes toward customer surveillance and 
attitudes toward general or government 
surveillance needs to be investigated. This is 
to understand, compare, and contrast how 
attitudes formed in the consumer 
environment are different from those in other 
environments. Further research could explore 
other social, demographic, cultural, and 
psychographic variables that may impact the 
relationship between consumer surveillance, 
general surveillance, and other specific types 
of surveillance. 
The stability of these attitudes needs 
to be uncovered. Future research could 
examine how individuals’ attitudes change 
over time, as it is unclear how age or 
extraordinary experiences change 
individuals’ attitude towards customer 
surveillance. Moreover, research can explore 
how consumers react to significant or 
prolonged experiences with customer 
surveillance.  
The cognitive decision process when 
facing disclosure requests needs to be further 
assessed, as it appears that these attitudes can 
both rationally and heuristically influence 
these decisions. The findings of both studies 
provide a boundary to the utility of the 
privacy calculus concept, namely, individuals 
that do not have high consumer privacy and 
high consumer value concerns likely use a 
mix of rational and heuristic processing to 
arrive at their disclosure decisions. More 
research is needed into heuristic decisions to 
disclose or not disclose personal data, and 
also how these heuristic decision rules are 
formed. Furthermore, research needs to 
uncover under what conditions cue the 
rational process that supersedes dominant 
concern-based heuristics. Additional 
research could further investigate the extent 
to which data disclosure decisions are made 
using heuristic-based or analysis-based 
processes using experimental or brain 
imaging methods. 
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Value concerns have been researched 
extensively but within a narrow, price 
promotions context. However, consumer 
value is much broader than this context and 
this article provides more insight into how 
value concern changes consumer decisions 
when faced with personal data disclosure 
requests. Future research could examine the 
motivational aspects of hedonic and 
utilitarian benefits on the decision to disclose 
personal data. These findings could be 
applied to consumer engagement, marketing 
communications, firm positioning, and other 
marketing strategies.  
Privacy concerns have been well 
researched in the literature, but little 
emphasis has been placed on how consumers 
perceive customer surveillance. In the age of 
big data, different customer surveillance 
methods of collecting, storing, and using 
market intelligence might increase or allay 
consumer privacy concerns. Further research 
is needed to understand how consumer 
privacy concerns can be mitigated to better 
design products, services, and corporate 
privacy policies that are customized to 
attractive consumer segments. 
Although the informant sample 
provided valuable depth on these attitudes, 
additional factors not explored in this 
research that impact attitudes toward 
customer surveillance could be identified 
using other conceptual lenses or other 
research methods.  
 
This article introduces and 
conceptualizes attitudes toward customer 
surveillance that can account for responses to 
these types of surveillance. It explores these 
attitudes further through a series of consumer 
interviews resulting in four attitude 
archetypes. Then, using survey evidence, it 
confirms the behavioral consequences of 
these archetypes and shows how they are 
associated with cultural and psychological 
factors. Based on these archetypes, the article 
suggests how managers can protect customer 
relationships by using these attitudes to alter 
their product, services, privacy policies, 
customer surveillance practices. The article 
closes by presenting a research agenda that 
offers several avenues for researchers to 
further investigate how customer surveillance 
practices impact consumer behavior. 
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